Sunday, February 28, 2016

The pitfall of quoting a decision which quotes a decision

On pages 219 and 220 of the Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition by Sundiang Jr. and Aquino we have this problem  (pasted together) posed by the authors :


At the beginning we see that IAI, Inc., through LG, sold shares to AI, Inc. But towards the end of the paragraph it appears that LG was authorized to purchase the shares, not sell them. What gives?

The book based the problem on Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. vs CA, GR 125778, June 10, 2003. The switch from sale to purchase happened when toward the end of the problem the authors grafted the earlier decision quoted by SC in Inter-Asia. See Inter-Asia to see how the switch happened. Just a hint: it was really a sale.

This, I believe, is a pitfall for any author who tries to get a more recent decision for the sake of being more updated but eventually has to quote a precedent decision contained in the recent one.

This befell another book which I discussed here.

Saturday, February 27, 2016

Saturday typos, 27 February 2016

From the Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition by Jose R. Sundiang, Sr. and Timoteo B. Aquino:

Page 263,


Page 275,


Page 277,



Page 280,


Page 281,



Monday, February 22, 2016

Recommended reading for martial law anniversary

PLDT was still spotty yesterday, so no posting!

In the meantime here's recommended share for those who pined for the martial law time under Marcos and the millennials who think that we need a dictator to bring development to our country.
Wrong!!!!!!!

http://joeam.com/2016/02/22/a-message-to-those-who-did-not-experience-ferdinand-marcos-and-benigno-aquino-jr/

Saturday, February 20, 2016

Saturday typos, 20 February 2016

No postings last weekend due to intermittent PLDT connection.

For today we have these  items from the Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition  by Jose R. Sundiang, Sr. and Timoteo B. Aquino.

On page 189,



Page 193,

See the decision here for the correct word.

Page 195,



Sunday, February 7, 2016

When result resulted from resulting

From page 453 and 454 of the Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition by Jose R. Sundiang, Sr. and Timoteo B. Aquino:


We have a few quibbles here. First, too many "results" in one sentence. The SC ruling was parsimonious with only one.
The appellate court ruled, gathered from the testimonies and sworn marine protests of the respective vessel masters of Limar I and MT Iron Eagle, that there was no way by which the barge’s or the tugboat’s crew could have prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I and should strengthen the factual findings of the appellate court.
Second, my professor in Legal Writing, Atty. Gallardo A. Escobar, Jr., would have added that there is a dangling modifier here. It would seem that the fortuitous event resulted from the barge being tossed by waves.

Anyone in the class would have revised it this way:
The court ruled that the sinking of the barge towed by the tugboat was a result of a fortuitous event. The barge was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height and buffeted by strong winds causing the entry of water through the barge's hatches.
Notice that instead of "into" the revision used "through" which is more precise. The hatch of a barge serves as an entrance into its hold. Technically, the water entered into the hold through the hatch.

Saturday, February 6, 2016

Saturday typos, 6 Feb 2016

From the Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition by Jose R. Sundiang, Sr. and Timoteo B. Aquino:

Page 176,


Page 489,


Should be: ...expenses occasioned by ...

Page 494,


Sunday, January 31, 2016

No blogging but . . . Supreme Court ruling is curative

I don't have time to post today because of an assignment in our Practice Court subject under Lawyer-General Fritz QuiƱanola. But I could not let this pass.

An online article in the Inquirer says that the ruling of the Supreme Court releasing  Sen. Enrile from jail may have cured him of his ailments:

. . . scientists were left wondering whether supreme courts may now have an important though previously undetected curative role in the delivery of medical care.

Saturday, January 30, 2016

Saturday typos, 30 January 2016

From the Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 14, 2008 Edition by Edgardo L. Paras:

Page 112,



Page 567,



Page 570,


Click on the images to see the correct phrase/spelling.

Sunday, January 24, 2016

Arresting questions . . . Part 2

I part 1 I asked why  a judge is required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant but there is no such equivalent requisite for an arrest warrant. I'll attempt in this post to fathom out the reason

First, let us trace the evolution of the rules.

1964 edition.
Search warrant.  Judge  personally examines the complainant and the witnesses. No mention of searching questions.
Warrant of arrest. Judge conducts preliminary examination or rely on the one done by the investigating officer  before issuing a warrant of arrest.
1985/1988 edition.
Search warrant. Judge personally examines through searching questions.
Warrant of arrest.  MTC judge personally examines through searching questions. But not such requirement for RTC judge. (Rule 112, Sec. 6 and 9)
2000 edition.
Search warrant.  Same as in 1985/1988 edition.
Warrant of arrest.  No more  personal examination nor searching questions in Sec. 5 but retained in Sec. 8.
 In summary, personal examination of witnesses has been required in search warrants in all reiteration of the Rules with the addition of "searching questions" beginning with the 1985 edition. For warrants of arrest, personal examination was not required in the 1964 Rules; added in 1985/1988 editions with the additional requirement of "searching questions";  dropped in the 2000 edition.

So what happened in between the 1964, 1985/1988 and 2000 editions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure?

On November 14, 1988 the case of Soliven vs Makasiar, G.R. No. 82827, was decided by the Supreme Court. Relevant portion says,
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
This could be the reason for the change from the 1988 to 2000 Rules. But why? The SC in its decision in Soliven vs Makasiar added:
"Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts."
Yet the question still remains: why is personal examination required in search warrants but not in arrest warrants? Isn't what is good for the goose also good for the gander? The SC seems to have settled the question in Lim vs Felix, G.R. Nos. 94054-57, Feb. 19, 1991:
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.
When I threw the question at Judge Mein Paredes one evening in class he added that the process for issuing a search warrant, unlike that of warrant of arrest, is ex parte. I failed to  ask for more explanation from him as we were winding up the session.

Seguro, research pa more tayo!

Addendum Jan 25, 2016: Have you been wondering why these comments pertaining to "searching questions and answers"  on Rule 112. Sec. 5 are still on your textbooks?

Page 395 of Regalado's Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 2008 Edition -


Page 235 of Pamaran's Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 2012 Edition -


It's because the authors have carried over their annotation from the previous editions of their books before the advent of Soliven vs Makasiar.

Saturday, January 23, 2016

Saturday typos, 23 January 2016

From Reviewer on Commercial Law, 2014 Edition by Jose R. Sundiang, Sr. and Timoteo B. Aquino:

Page 118


Page 167


Page 276